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i

REPLY ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CORRECTLY APPLY
THE NOLLAN-DOLAN STANDARD IS NOT AN "ISSUE OF FACT"
ENTITLED TO DEFERENTIAL REVIEW ON APPEAL
In

its

brief

the

COUNTY

nevertheless legally-incorrect

advances

the

novel

but

assertion that the District

Court's analysis, rulings and conclusions regarding the
"rough proportionality" issue

which is essentially THE

core issue in this case

are an "issue of fact" entitled to

a

of

deferential

standard

review.

Such

is

absolutely

incorrect. Although the "rough proportionality"
does require some "factual" issues
cases),

question

(as do most litigated

the correct application thereof to the material

facts is an "issue of law" and for which the Court of
Appeals should review without any particular deference or
presumption that the District Court "did it right".
The trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are
reviewed for correctness. Society of Separationists, Inc. vs
Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) . This
standard

of

review

has

also

been

referred

to

as

a

"correction of error standard". Jacobsen Investment Company
vs State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme
Court 1992);

Sanders vs Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah

Supreme Court 1992). "Correction of error" means that no
^

particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah
Supreme Court 1994) ; Provo River Water Users' Association vs
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State
vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) ; Howell
vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) .
II
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COUNTY'S
"HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE AND ITS APPLICATION
TO B.A.M. IS READILY APPARENT
It does not take a "rocket scientist" to readily
observe and conclude that the unconstitutionality of the
COUNTY'S so-called "highway-abutting" Ordinance

requiring,

as a condition of issuance of governmental permission for
development approval (ala subdivision development and/or
building permit issuance) the uncompensated dedication of
roadway

AND

improvements

the

required

installation

of

adjacent

is apparent: for "Takings Clause" reasons and

for obvious "equal protection" reasons. [One need merely pay
close attention to the COUNTY'S oft-repeated phrasing that
the exactions (dedication and improvements installation) are
required against "highway-abutting" property owners (such as

B.A.M.

ar , ".

.

iMt^d"

arsons'' . Unstated,

nevertheless carefully concealed in t:ic
is :.he s m i ^ - i-<

' •

parcels

'•. •

^

:\r

undei

Those

*

"non-abutting"

ana ail
parcels

are

'" ievelopment restrict ion" .

/nu.
the

-^'

" **" -" ut,

wl-i :i create the same

"impact" upon the roadway, are all exeiq"exaction

but

exactions

uncoi...

' ' "

" "; : ••Jiiway-abuttinq" Ordinance, and

derived

thereunde.

« :-

3 " i^ir.n " '^iif first

Nollan case in 1^8

.. .viierem in J

fr0111

identified

the

in the

:•*>•-•'• :oreme Court

Wlote:
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause t^
be
more
than
a
pleading
requirement,
and
compliance with it more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier,
our cases describe the condition for abridgement
of property rights through the police power as a
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State
interest. We are inclined to be particularly
careful about the objective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that
context there is a heightened risk that the
purpose
is
avoidance
of
the
compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police power
objective.
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Indeed, wtinn coupled with the simple fact that

q

other "similarly-situated" parcels

(in terms of roadway

traffic "impact", not "highway-abutting" status) are not
required to sustain any exaction, that conclusion
"avoidance

of

the

compensation

requirement"

i.e.
is

inescapable. The "avoidance of the compensation requirement
(of the Just Compensation Clause)" does not "advance a
legitimate governmental interest".
The COUNTY'S

failure

to acknowledge

and obey the

constitutional requirement (clearly a matter of law since
1987 after Nolan was announced) was evident all through the
initial trial and even on appeal. For example, the COUNTY
has stated
The exaction in this case then, is not an "ad hoc"
discretionary
assessment
imposed
on
an
individualized basis at the whim of some
bureaucrat, or based upon unique impact factors
attributable exclusively to BAM's particular
development.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND CROSS-RESPONDENT SALT LAKE
COUNTY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI [2004] , page 6. Emphasis added.
One need merely examine the trial court's "findings"
and "conclusions", including the actual assertions, the
nuances

thereof, and

reflecting

the

the apparent

COUNTY'S

thinking

logical
on

the

progression
subject

to

ascertain what really happened in 1998. COUNTY Traffic
Engineer

Pullos, confronted

with B.A.M.'s

request

for

development approval, merely called up UDOT and Wasatch
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an

alternative

: ui the mathematical

Such ;i simplistic approach is consistent with her
testimony, as well as the documentary evidence produced before
the original trial in the District Court. This issue, however/
is not herein raised to establish the COUNTY'S failure to
effect Dolan's "burden of proof" requirements; rather, the
identification of this issue is to point out the consistency
of the COUNTY'S
"findings" as reflecting the actual
presentation of the evidence to the District Court. That same
procedural, approach is arguably following in the COUNTY'S
recitation of the historical facts, as contained in its BRIEF.
n

derivation/justification

of the "rough proportionality"

exaction against B.A.M. This apparent abandonment implicitly
acknowledges the correctness of B.A.M. original assertions:
that the COUNTY'S and the District Court's methodology in
apply Dolan were incorrect.
But it is now "too late" for the COUNTY to re-enter a
different horse in the race or to "change bets" at the
conclusion of the race. The District Court has entered its
"findings" and "conclusions", and the COUNTY is essentially
bound by the entered "findings" and "conclusions". The
COUNTY cannot now

for the first time on appeal

claim

that "Judge Hansen might have ruled this way, for this
reason". The

simple

fact

is that Judge Hansen wasn't

presented with that issue, and he didn't rule that way. So
to say or infer otherwise is inappropriate.
The COUNTY'S newly identified assertion

i.e. "rough

proportionality" of the exaction imposed upon B.A.M. can be
determined by the length of the traffic link roadway [7200
West to 8400 West: approximately 7900 feet]

contradicts

long-established, "black letter" law that an issue first
raised on appeal will not be considered. See Holmstrom vs C
R England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281 (Utah Court of
Appeals 2000)

[before a party may advance an issue on

appeal, the record must clearly show that it was timely

presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to
obtain a ruling thereon], Salt Lake County vs Calston, 776
P.d 653 (Utah Court of Appeals 1989) [issues presented for
first time on appeal are deemed waived, precluding Court of
Appeals from considering their merits on appeal], Buehner
Block Co vs UWC Associates, 752 P. 2d 892 (Utah Supreme Court
1988)

[record must clearly

show the issue was timely

presented to trial court in manner sufficient to obtain
ruling thereon] , and Olson vs Park-Craig-Olson, Inc, 815
P.2d 1356 (Utah Court of Appeals 1991) [appellate court may
weigh only those facts and legal arguments preserved in
trial court record].
That the COUNTY'S newly-identified justification was
not presented to the trial court is implicitly acknowledged
not only by the lack of any written "finding" to that
specific issue, but also the issue directly contradicts the
District Court's expressed "findings" and the "conclusions",
particularly "conclusion of law #5" which is the essential
"core" of the District Court's resolution of the problem. In
this context, the Court of Appeals must remember that the
COUNTY could have presented any theory, or even multiple
theories,

to

the

trial

court,

for

"finding"

and/or

"conclusion", if such were in the record.
The newly-advanced issue was not litigated, there was
Q

no significant evidence presented on the issue (although
there was brief evidence presented only as to the length of
the roadway "link" (i.e. approximately one and one-half
miles), but not more. There was absolutely no evidence
adduced

at

trial

as

to

the

"value"

of

the

existing

improvement" [see Banberry Development Corporation vs South
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah Supreme Court 1981)] as is
otherwise required to satisfy the "constitutional standard
of reasonableness".
Not only is the Record devoid of any such "value"
evidence, the newly-derived arithmetic calculations by the
COUNTY contain the following conceptual flaws:
1.

By

focusing

merely

upon

the

real

estate

"dedication", the methodology continues to ignore
and overlook B.A.M.'s claim for $200,000+ of outof-pocket expenses associated with the roadway
improvements

(curb,

gutter,

sidewalk,

and

so

forth) it was required to install, benefitting the
public-at-large and from which B.A.M. achieved no
individualized benefit, except as members of the
public-at-large.
2.

Had the newly-identified issue been litigated,

the truthful evidence would have been that the
3500 South roadway for the "link" is simply not

"wide open"

(undersigned's terminology) to the

full 106-foot right-of-way width (as the COUNTY'S
mathematical methodology implies), but is rather
a

roadway

of varying

widths, at many places

significantly more narrow (sometimes as narrow as
a single traffic lane each direction) and adjacent
to already developed adjacent properties. Thus,
when the roadway is fully improved (ostensibly by
UDOT at some futuristic time), UDOT will have to
pay significant amounts to acquire the necessary
"right-of-way", which the COUNTY knows is not
presently

there.

That

incorporates

that

mathematical

fraction

the

COUNTY

right-of-way

implicitly
into

its

(as the denominator) is

erroneous.
IV
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL
This entire case

in the District Court originally,

"on appeal" to both appellate courts, and following the
Supreme Court's "remand" to the District Court

centers on

the "constitutional" issues raised in the original pleading
[RECORD, page 1] and concluding with the District Court's
"Memorandum Decision" [RECORD of "remand proceeding" October
2006, page 247-253] , impliedly if not facially acknowledging

that the "rough proportionality" issue was presented to the
District Court for adjudication.
The Plaintiff's arguments and position vis-a-vis the
constitutional claims asserted within this appeal are more
than

adequately

identified

and

addressed

within

the

PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF (April 2001) [RECORD at 75-105],
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW (May 2001) [RECORD at
150-246], and more recently the PLAINTIFF'S "TRIAL BRIEF"
FOLLOWING REMAND FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT (October 2 0 06)
[RECORD at 503-537] .
The

claims

of

B.A.M.

are

more

than

adequately

identified and preserved. The COUNTY'S arguments on that
issue are spurious and disingenuous.
V
THE NATURE OF THIS APPEAL
TO REVIEW
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CORRECTLY APPLY
THE NOLLAN-DOLAN "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY" STANDARD
DOES NOT REQUIRE THE "MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE"
Similarly,

the COUNTY'S

assertions

concerning

the

Appellant's claimed "failure to marshal the evidence" from
the Record are disingenuous and erroneous. This "appeal" is
not framed to have arisen from a narrow evidentiary ruling
buried in the Record, or even from a claim that the evidence
fails to support the verdict. For the most part, the
"evidence" adduced at trial (i.e. 3.04% roadway traffic
"impact"; uncompensated required dedication of real estate

and installation of adjacent improvements) is undisputed.2
B.A.M.'s claims can be adjudicated on appeal essentially
without resort to the Record from the trial court. The
District Court's "findings" and "conclusions" essentially
recite the actual "evidence", essentially correctly.
But those "findings" and "conclusions" themselves
facially so

as written by the COUNTY and as accepted by

the District Court materially manifest the District Court's
failure to understand and apply the "rough proportionality"
standard.
Such is the B.A.M. "appeal" and no "marshalling" should
be expected or required.

2

The Appellant
B.A.M.
asserts
that
the
actual
"denominator" for the "traffic impact percentage" should not
be the 12,000 vehicles per day starting number (thus deriving
the 3.04%) , but rather should be the 36,000+ vehicles per day
as the carrying capacity of the roadway fully improved to the
53-foot "half-width", as B.A.M. was required to dedicate and
improve across its 900-foot frontage. Indeed, the mathematical
and conceptual accuracy of that methodology is implicitly
acknowledged by the COUNTY'S attempt
not per se allowed on
appeal
to recast and recharacterize the extent of the
improvements and roadway right-of-way (and thus its ultimate
"carrying capacity") for the roadway "link".
Also note that were this case to be an "impact fees" case
(by which the costs of the improved roadway are more equitably
spread across-the-board to other developments, which is not
the case here) , state statute
Section 11-36-102 (14) (b) , Utah
Code
prohibits the use of "state roadways" in the numerical
calculations to arrive at the "impact fee" to be charged by
local government. Such being the stated legislative policy of
the State, the COUNTY is definitely "on thin ice" for the
uncompensated, required exaction imposed upon B.A.M.
i o

VI
THE "RIPENESS", "FINALITY" AND
"EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES" ARGUMENTS
OF THE COUNTY ARE DISINGENUOUS AND INCORRECT
The COUNTY'S arguments as to "(lack of) ripeness",
"finality" and "exhaustion of administrative remedies" and
so forth, as asserted in its Brief, are all generally and
specifically disingenuous and incorrect. Those arguments are
simply the rehash of earlier arguments, arising from the
flawed misunderstanding, conveniently assumed by the COUNTY
for self-serving purposes that this case is a "land-use
appeal". This case isn't.
This case is a straight-up pleaded litigation for the
unconstitutional

"takings"

and

"equal

protection"

violations, in an "inverse condemnation" action, brought
under

the

"self-executing"

provisions

of

the

Utah

Constitution (and the corresponding federal provisions, per
Nollan and Dolan) . There is and was no requirement for any
"notice of claim" to be filed in advance of the litigation,
as a condition precedent to the litigation. See Colman vs
State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990) . Similarly, there
was no requirement for any "administrative hearing". See
Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court
essentially ruled on the merits

inferential, implied or

otherwise

of these issues, to the detriment of the COUNTY.

The issues ought not be revisited.
Finality and ripeness of the "administrative appeal",
"administrative exhaustion of remedies", and so forth are
disingenuously advanced, for a number of simple reasons:
1.

First and foremost, the COUNTY

in 1998

acting through the Board of County Commissioners,
refused to even consider the BAM "administrative
appeal".

[It wasn't that the COUNTY Board of

Commissioners "heard" the appeal and then denied
the appeal; the Board refused to even hear it!]
Thus, it is disingenuous for the COUNTY to now
claim

there are

"exhaustion

of remedies" and

related issues precluding judicial review of the
pleaded claims.]
2.

As far as any "ripeness" question goes, we are

here dealing with an actual "physical taking",
effected in 1999 pursuant to final action by the
COUNTY in finally approving of the development.
Even though the litigation had been filed in 1998,
the COUNTY had that entire year to rescind its
earlier action and has had almost eight years
since to rescind its "taking" decision. To say now
that the case has "ripeness" features is simply
-i £

incorrect and disingenuous.
Plaintiff's

claims

as

to

"equal

protection"

and

"uniform operation of laws" have always been and are partand-parcel of the Plaintiff's case. Those claims have never
been abandoned. That the Utah Supreme Court's original "writ
of certiorari" review of the original B.A.M. Development I
(Court of Appeals 2004) decision was narrowly confined to
the narrow procedural or substantive questions which the
Supreme Court framed for that certiorari review should not
be now construed to preclude BAM from making its historic
claims. The
claims

"equal protection" and

"uniform operation"

as well as the "state law" claims of "reasonable

relationship"

[Call vs West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 217 (Utah

Supreme Court 1979), on rehearing 614 P.2d

1259

(Utah

Supreme Court 1980)] and "the constitutional standard of
reasonableness" (Banberry Development vs South Jordan City
(1981)]

are essentially the same constitutional basis,

albeit framed and approached somewhat differently.
Had the COUNTY recognized and followed Dolan from the
beginning
first

administratively

District

Court

and/or even judicially in the

proceeding

(in which

the

COUNTY

advanced spurious arguments and justifications which were
unanimously swept aside by all eight appellate judges) we
probably wouldn't now be arguing about how broadly or
"1 £

narrowly the Utah Supreme Court should have decided things
on "certiorari" and/or what was preserved within that
"appeal".
Similarly,

the

COUNTY

likewise

forgets

that

its

administrative staff similarly rejected BAM's offer to not
effect the roadway improvements, unless and until UDOT
actually required those improvements and was willing to pay
for those improvements (at government expense) and would
through eminent domain acquire the necessary right-of-way
(from the existing pavement) to the so-called 53-foot line.
See Testimony of Scott McCleary, RECORD/TRANSCRIPT at pages
35, lines 1 through 18, and Page 42, lines 5-13, in "remand
hearing" (October 2006) .
Furthermore,

any

"lack

of

administrative

appeal"

arguments (from the COUNTY) must be disregarded for the
simple

reason

essentially

that

mandated

the
the

"highway-abutting"

Ordinance

unconstitutional

exaction

(installation of improvements, regardless of the right-ofway "width" dedication) and the COUNTY could not ignore or
disregard the mandatory provisions of its own ordinance.
So for the COUNTY to now "split hairs" on issues of
"ripeness", "finality" and/or "exhaustion of administrative
remedies" is simply disingenuous and should not be accepted.
As far as B.A.M.'s claimed

(by COUNTY) "failure to

object" trial court's "findings" and so forth, the Plaintiff
wasn't given an opportunity to "object" or even comment to
the District Court's findings and conclusions. The District
Court issued its written Memorandum Decision on 27 December;
copies thereof were mailed to counsel. Assuming, for sake of
argument, that COUNTY'S counsel prepared the findings
facially indicating that Lohra Miller was then the District
Attorney (which didn't occur until January 2nd), and that a
copy thereof was thereafter served upon Plaintiff's counsel
(the document itself doesn't even indicate such was actually
done)

Plaintiff's counsel would have, theoretically "ten

days" in which to respond and comment, and perhaps even
object. And because the ten days is "less than eleven days",
intervening weekend days are not included, thus extending
until January 14th (or even later if service by mail was
utilized). But Judge Hansen signed the "findings" on January
11th, a mere 9 days after the earliest possible date those
"findings" could have been filed with the Court and served
upon counsel.
Given Judge Tim Hanson's seeming urgency and propensity
to

"get

rid

of

this

case"

retirement from the bench

judicially

following

his

any additional effort seeking

Judge Hanson's "review" or reconsideration of the "findings"
would be an exercise in futility.
i o

As noted above, B.A.M. does not really take issue with
the entered "findings", which essentially and accurately
reflect what actually happened and, for the most part, the
evidence adduced at trial: not necessarily all the evidence,
but at least the evidence necessary for the District Court's
determination

nevertheless believed to be wrong

of "no

cause of action". That the COUNTY chose an illogical method
to arrive at that "conclusion" [#5] evidences exactly why
and how this appeal is meritorious.
VII
"EQUAL PROTECTION" AND "UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS"
CLAIMS OF B.A.M. AGAINST THE "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE
AND THE REQUIRED EXACTIONS THEREUNDER
ARE MERITORIOUS AND LIKEWISE INVALIDATE THE
COUNTY-REQUIRED EXACTION (OF DEDICATION AND IMPROVEMENT)
As noted earlier, the unconstitutionality
and as applied in this case

facially

of the so-called "highway-

abutting" Ordinance (whereunder only those parcels abutting
the roadway are exacted against, while nearby parcels
creating the same "impact" described in terms of vehicles on
the

roadway

anything)

are

not

is readily

required

to dedicate

or

apparent. The Ordinance

improve
and its

exactions cannot be justified or defended, even if it is
uniformly applied against all "highway-abutting" parcels,
while simultaneously leaving untouched "similarly-situated"
(the COUNTY'S frequently cited terminology, albeit for the
1 Q

incorrect

analytical

point)

parcels

having

the

same

corresponding "impact" (defined in vehicles, not adjacency
to the roadway).
In Malan vs Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court
1984),

the Utah

Supreme

"automobile guest statute"

Court

invalidating

the Utah

illuminated and articulated the

purposes and application of the "uniform operation of laws"
and the "equal protection" provisions of the constitutions.
In Malan the Utah Supreme Court stated:
For a law to be constitutional under Article I,
section 24, it is not enough that it be uniform on
its face. What is critical is that the operation
of the law be uniform. A law does not operate
uniformly if "persons similarly situated are not
"treated similarly" or if "persons in different
circumstances"
are
"treated
as
if
their
circumstances were the same."
693 P.2d 661 at 669. Emphasis added.
The dedication and the improvement required from the
Plaintiff

when

the

similarly-situated,

"side-by-side"

developer of "Elusive Meadows" immediately to the south pays
nothing is not the "uniform operation" the constitution
requires.

The

"abutting-highway"

criterion

for

the

"classification" is a blatant, straight-forward attempt to
avoid

the

constitution

requirement

of paying

for the

"taking".
In State Tax Commission vs Department of Finance, 576
P. 2d 1297 (Utah Supreme Court 1978), the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
Equal
protection
protects
against
discrimination within a class. The legislature has
considerable discretion in the designation of
classifications but the court must determine
whether such classifications operate equally on
all persons similarly situated.
Thus, whether a classification operates
uniformly
on all persons
situated
within
constitutional parameters is an issue that must
ultimately be decided by the judiciary.
576 P.2d at 1298. Emphasis added.
The Defendant COUNTY would have the Court believe there
is

no

"equal

protection"

and/or

"uniform

operation"

violation because the "highway-abutting" approach treats all
"similarly-situated" propertyowners the same: all "highwayabutting"

property

owners

must

effect

the

required

dedications and make the required improvements and all other
(i.e. non-"highway-abutting") propertyowners don't have to
do anything! It is that simple! The constitutions require
that

similarly-situated

propertyowners

at

persons

large)

be

(in

treated

this
"equally"

case,
and

"uniformly". Everyone ought to be required to contribute an
equitable share to the costs of the roadways which everyone
is entitled to use. A single group, regardless of how
creatively or carefully defined (i.e. "highway-abutting"),
of propertyowners cannot be unconstitutionally coerced to
provide 100% of the costs of the roadway improvements,
merely by reason of the "coincidence of geography".
01

In the instant case, there are but two classification
groups: those "highway-abutting" parcels forced to bear 100%
and those parcels which do not abut a highway (and are thus
entitled to pay nothing, even though they may create the
exact same impact. The residents of the Elusive Meadows
subdivision immediately to the south of Westridge Meadows do
not merely hop in their car, drive down Montclair Drive
almost to 3500 South, and then turn around and return to
their homes, without exiting the subdivisions onto 3500
South. Those "Elusive Meadows" residents do utilize 3500
South, for which they have paid nothing. The situation
should not be, for example, wherein Elusive Meadows people
pay nothing and the Westridge Meadows pays everything.
CONCLUSION
The

COUNTY'S

"highway-abutting"

Ordinance

and the

"exactions" required thereunder (not merely a real estate
dedication

but

improvements)

also
is

a

the

installation

blatant

attempt

of
to

adjacent
evade

the

constitutional requirement of "paying for the change". Those
excessive, unconstitutional burdens cannot be imposed upon
B.A.M. merely because of the geographic misfortune of being
adjacent to a roadway the COUNTY desires to have widened and
improved. The

"exaction"

(dedication and

improvements)

benefit the public-at-large and are of no specific benefit

to B.A.M.'s residents, except as members of the public-atlarge

(because

Similarly,

of

the

the

impassable

exaction

is

barrier

excessive

fencing).

because

other

improvements were required for the "frontage" of those lots
on the "internal street" of the development.
The District

Court

failed

to correctly

apply the

Nollan-Dolan "rough proportionality" standard: the COUNTY'S
seeming abandonment of its original mathematical and legal
justification
COUNTY-prepared

(ala Conclusion #5) , as reflected in the
"findings"

and

"conclusions",

and

the

COUNTY'S newly-identified request to adopt an alternative
methodology not presented to the District Court confirm the
B.A.M. position that the COUNTY (and the District Court)
simply have done it wrong. The District Court's "conclusion
#5" is clearly erroneous as a "matter of law" as to the
application of the "rough proportionality" standard.
The District Court decision must be reversed and the
case remanded to the District Court for entry of judgment in
favor of B.A.M. for the entirety of its claims: the value of
the real estate dedication as well as the direct expenses
for the required improvements to the 3500 South roadway.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of August, 2007.
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